Beyond the Vacuum Illusion: Why Iranian Decline Would Be No Blessing for Turkey in Post-Assad Middle East

A Foreign Policy article published recently, "In the Post-Assad Middle East, Iran's Loss is Turkey's Gain," written by Vali Nasr, in december 2024, argues that waning Iranian influence in Lebanon and Syria means a new area of opportunity for Turkey. This is a kind of Western geopolitical optimism in Ankara, but hugely underestimates depth of experience of region with changing alliances and over estimates Turkish prowess for taking advantage of what constitutes a newly created vacuum.

My essay disproves the above thesis based on empirical inquiry, observation of region-wide current trends, and geostrategic analysis.

1. The Illusion of Strategic Substitution

The assumption that Turkey can easily replace Iran is based on the misleading assumption that regionwide power vacuums are necessarily filled by the next most powerful actor. History shows us otherwise. As the United States withdrew from Iraq, Iran filled the vacuum not merely because it was available but because of its already-existing ideological, military, and economic infrastructures. Turkey lacks comparable embedded infrastructures inside of Lebanon and Syria.

Additionally, the seat that Iran vacated won't be unoccupied for very long; instead, a new security architecture predicated on a U.S.-Israel-Gulf alliance is on track to fill it. Such a system could deliberately exclude Turkey, which more and more is considered a revisionist power.

2. Security Pressures Instead of Strategic Gains

Rather than a windfall, Iran’s withdrawal may increase Turkey’s exposure to security risks. The removal of Iran-backed militias has paved the way for Israeli and U.S.-backed forces to become more visible. In this reshuffling, Turkey’s military presence—already viewed by many as an occupation—may become isolated and subject to new diplomatic and military pressures. A more structured security framework could significantly constrain Turkey’s freedom of action. Any future transition authority backed by the U.S. or funded by Gulf states may not engage Ankara, especially considering its deteriorating relations with both Western powers and Arab governments.

3. Economic Marginalization during the Reconstruction Phase

Proponents of the "Turkey benefits from Iran’s withdrawal" narrative are oblivious to the likelihood of Western and Gulf actors assuming control of the reconstruction process. Political distrust, a predilection for technocratic and stable partners (such as Jordan or Egypt), and weaknesses of the Turkish economy at the moment might find Ankara on the sidelines of large reconstruction awards.

They prefer stability and predictability in diplomacy—virtues Erdogan's current combative policy may not fit.

4. Domestic Political Externalities

With rising local security threats, the Turkish state might instrumentalize these incidents to expand domestic repression. In the cause of counterterrorism, we can anticipate increasing authoritarianism, restrictions on freedom of the press, and suppression of political opposition being wrapped in a framing of a national security question.

5. Methodological Critique:

Strategic Forecasting and Game Theory

A basic game theory framework reveals that regional dynamics function as multi-actor interactions rather than binary win-lose outcomes. Iran's weakening would only benefit Turkey if Ankara could credibly align with at least two other major powers (e.g., the U.S. and Saudi Arabia)—a scenario not supported by current diplomatic conditions.

Additionally, Bayesian inference models suggest that regional actors update their beliefs based on past behavior. Given Turkey’s inconsistent policies in Syria, it is unlikely that actors would revise their threat perceptions in Ankara's favor simply because Iran is receding.

According to me:

The "Iran’s loss is Turkey’s gain" narrative is a seductive but oversimplified one. Strategic influence in the Middle East is not a zero-sum proposition, and strategic voids rarely go unfilled without dispute.. Without a wholesale foreign policy rebalancing, reestablishment of fundamental alliances, and domestic economic normalization, Turkey is better positioned to be alone by virtue of Iran’s decline rather than fortified.

This essay aims to reconcile dominant discourse and make a case for a more complex, multi-variable analysis of regional trends that goes beyond shallow geopolitical optimism.